

TOP SECRET

Desk

*file copy
ed*

5 January 1961

25X1

Copy No. C 74

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



25X1

TOP SECRET


Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

5 January 1961

25X1

DAILY BRIEF




II. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

III. ASIA-AFRICA

25X1

Turkey: The resignation of Turkey's 18-man cabinet on 4 January appears to have been pro forma, preparatory to the convocation of the new Constituent Assembly on 6 January. Those who resigned will continue in office until a new cabinet is named from among the members of the new assembly, probably sometime next week. President Gursel may use this opportunity to increase his popularity among the Turkish people by selecting ministers who have political influence rather than primarily professional experience. The two previous cabinets, made up mainly of technicians, have failed

OK



25X1

25X1

to attract popular support to the new regime. Some of the key ministers such as Foreign Minister Sarper will probably remain in the new cabinet. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

[REDACTED]

[Pakistan: Recent editorials in two of Pakistan's leading papers, probably approved by the military government, have called for "gradual disengagement" from Western alliances and for improved relations with the bloc. While President Ayub has made it clear that Pakistan remains committed to its alliance with the US and strongly supported Western positions during his recent Middle and Far Eastern tours, the government probably hopes such press comment will serve as a reminder to the United States that it should not take Pakistan's cooperation for granted and increase aid to India at Pakistan's expense.] [REDACTED] (Page 3)

25X1

[REDACTED]

[Burma: General Ne Win is under increasing pressure from army leaders to resume control of the government, [REDACTED] Ne Win agrees that the situation in the country "has reached serious proportions" and asserts that Premier Nu's continued misrule might force him to act "very soon." Meanwhile, Nu is having trouble in his own Union party. Nu is expected voluntarily to relinquish formal leadership of the party at a conference in February but will continue as the dominant political figure in Burma. He is planning, however, to back a minority faction]

25X1

25X1

OK

5 Jan 61

DAILY BRIEF

ii

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005500040001-6

Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005500040001-6

25X1

[redacted] of the party for party leadership and, should his efforts fail, he may lose control of his party. [redacted]
[redacted]

25X1

25X1

IV. THE WEST

France-Algeria: [redacted]

25X1

lowered army morale since the government's decision to hold the referendum on its Algerian policy and the pro-rebel Moslem demonstrations during De Gaulle's 9-13 December visit. Marshal Juin's open letter explaining why he will vote "no" in the 6-8 January referendum is having repercussions among officers in Algeria. Widespread military disapproval of De Gaulle's policy will pose a threat to any new initiative he may attempt following the referendum if the over-all majority is slim, and particularly if there should be a negative result in Algeria.]

[redacted] is said to have commented [redacted] that "serious trouble"]

5 Jan 61

DAILY BRIEF

iii

25X1

[] lies ahead in Algeria and there will probably be a major up-
rising just before or during the referendum.

[] both Moslems
and Europeans in Oran are planning a general strike today.]

5X1

No

V. WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS

- A. No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hostilities against the United States or its possessions in the immediate future.
- B. No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends deliberately to initiate direct military action against US forces abroad, US allies, or areas peripheral to the bloc in the immediate future.
- C. With continuing substantial bloc logistic support, particularly airlift, the Kong Le/Pathet Lao forces have achieved a tactical capability of bringing substantial pressure against government forces in a number of areas throughout Laos. In the event of a Pathet Lao move against such major points as Luang Prabang, Vientiane, or Pak Sane, the Boun Oum government will probably ask for overt outside assistance.

No

[] [A]-
though the bloc probably prefers that the Laotian conflict
not be expanded beyond its present scale, it apparently is]

25X1

5 Jan 61

DAILY BRIEF

iv

25X1

[determined to maintain such military pressure as is required to achieve at a minimum a "neutralized" Laos. The bloc is probably prepared to increase its military commitments within Laos to the extent required to counter such outside military support as might be provided to the Phoumi forces. * [redacted]

*The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, would omit the last two sentences for the following reasons: 1) The content of these two sentences is estimative in nature and thus beyond the purview of the Watch Character. 2) The statements prejudge conditions which may not actually arise. 3) There is insufficient intelligence information to justify the statements made in the next to last sentence, and there is no intelligence information to support the assertion contained in the last sentence. [redacted]

[The Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, is in agreement that the bloc probably prefers that the Laotian conflict not be expanded beyond its present scale but does not believe sufficient evidence exists to warrant the conclusion that the minimum bloc objective is the achievement of a "neutralized" Laos. The Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, further believes that the conclusion that the bloc is probably prepared to increase its military commitments in Laos to the extent required to counter such outside military support as might be provided to the Phoumi forces cannot be supported by available information. [redacted]

5 Jan 61

DAILY BRIEF

v

Resignation of Turkish Cabinet Prefaces Convocation
Of Constituent Assembly

The resignation of Turkey's 18-man cabinet on 4 January appears to be pro forma, preliminary to the convocation of the new Constituent Assembly on 6 January. Despite rumors in Ankara of a cabinet shake-up, there is no indication of widespread discord within the government. Finance Minister Alican resigned on 24 December, ostensibly to gain political freedom of action but in reality because he disagreed with the plan of the ruling Committee of National Union (CNU) to raise military salaries substantially.

The resignation may reflect the concept, not clearly defined in Turkish constitutional law, that a cabinet should resign when a new government is established. Some of those who resigned, such as Foreign Minister Sarper, Deputy Premier Ozdilek, and Minister of Defense Ataman, will probably be included in the new cabinet.

The Ankara Home Service announced on 4 January that the cabinet had submitted its resignation in order to permit President Gursel full freedom of action "at a time when our democratic development has entered a new stage. . . ." The former cabinet ministers will continue in office pending the formation of a new cabinet. The CNU may have prompted the resignations to clear the way for broader political representation in an effort to win popular support. The two previous cabinets were made up primarily of technicians [redacted]

[redacted] President Gursel may also hope to promote his own political future by selecting men who are more loyal to him. The new appointees may indicate the political leanings of the CNU; some of the suggested ministers are strong supporters of the Republican People's party (RPP).

Preparations continue for the meeting of the Constituent Assembly. Several prominent figures have been selected,

[redacted]

including the leaders of the two main parties, several former deputies, and at least two former cabinet ministers. The RPP is rumored to have strong support in the nonpolitical groups to be represented. In a move probably designed to gain added support from the minorities and attract international good will for the regime, Gursel has included in his personal selections representatives of the Greek, Armenian, and Jewish minorities. Nonetheless, there continue to be undercurrents of resistance and potential unrest throughout the country.

25X1

Pakistan Taking More Independent Position

25X1

[In recent editorials probably approved by the military government, two leading Pakistani papers have called for Pakistan's "gradual disengagement from the role of a committed nation" and for improved relations with the bloc. President Ayub has recently expressed concern over the flow of news articles that the United States would concentrate its aid on India, adding that Pakistani reaction to these stories was a problem for his government. The military regime probably hopes the recent editorials will serve as a warning to the incoming American administration that it should not take Pakistan's cooperation for granted and increase aid to India at Pakistan's expense.]

[President Ayub has made it clear that Pakistan remains committed to its alliance with the United States and strongly supported Western positions during his recent Middle and Far Eastern tours. During his visit to Cairo in early November, Ayub reportedly told newsmen who asked for his views on non-alignment: "I don't understand positive neutralism. You should ask President Nasir; he's the expert on neutralism." In Tokyo in mid-December Ayub told reporters that Pakistan stood ready to send troops to Laos if SEATO decided to intervene there.]

[While Pakistan plans no basic change in its commitments, it has moved to make a show of independence in its foreign policy, starting with its decision in the summer of 1959 to adopt a tougher line toward Afghanistan. Pakistan's current negotiations with the USSR for oil-exploration assistance are part of its more recent efforts to improve relations with Moscow. Rawalpindi probably considers Moscow's silence on the September border clashes with Afghanistan north of the Khyber Pass an encouraging sign. In addition, Ayub apparently hopes to persuade other Afro-Asian nations that it has a "flexible" foreign policy.]

25X1

25X1

25X1

Burmese Army May Resume Control of Government

Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005500040001-6

25X1

Senior Burmese Army officers, long discontented with administrative deterioration under Prime Minister Nu, have obtained assurances from General Ne Win that he intends to do something about it. [REDACTED]

25X1

[REDACTED] an army takeover may occur in February or March.

[REDACTED] Since Nu resumed the office of prime minister last April, Ne Win has opposed persistent demands from his army subordinates for a return to army rule, insisting that the elected civilian government be given an opportunity to prove its worth. It now appears, however, that the continued decline of law and order in the country and the deterioration of the economy since he resigned the prime ministership are convincing Ne Win that he should resume office. [REDACTED]

25X1

[REDACTED] There have been persistent reports of dissension within Nu's Union party and indications that he cannot control its actions. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

A national party conference is scheduled for February, at which time a showdown for party control is possible. Nu intends to step down from the party presidency, but will remain the dominant political figure in Burma. However, he is backing the minority faction against Union party Secretary General Kyaw Dun, [REDACTED] whose party role was the immediate cause of the 1958 breakup of the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League. Should Nu lose this struggle, his organizational backing and control of the government may disintegrate completely. There has been one report suggesting that because of the dissension within his party, Nu would welcome the army's return to power.

25X1

25X1

25X1

[REDACTED]

Deteriorating Military Morale Poses Threat to De Gaulle's Algerian Policy

25X1

[REDACTED] lowered army morale since the government's decision to hold the 6-8 January referendum on its Algerian policy and since the pro-rebel Moslem demonstrations during De Gaulle's 9-13 December visit. The air force is described as similarly affected, though to a lesser degree. The unity of the army is reportedly endangered by cleavages between junior officers and older generals and by differences between various units. The recent open letter by Marshal Alphonse Juin, France's highest ranking military figure, explaining why he will vote "no" in the referendum has reportedly stimulated "considerable thought" among French officers in Algeria. Repercussions of the Juin letter have also occurred among the military in France itself, where 16 reserve army generals who had previously held high commands in North Africa--including former chief of staff Guillaume--have publicly endorsed Juin's appeal in even more vehement terms.]

[Widespread military disapproval of De Gaulle's policy will pose a threat to any new initiative he may attempt following the referendum. De Gaulle expects to gain about a 65-percent majority in France; a narrower over-all majority or especially a negative result in Algeria would serve to stiffen military opposition to a new offer to negotiate with the rebel government. Extensive Moslem abstention, as ordered by the rebel Algerian government, or further pro-rebel demonstrations in Algeria would probably also be interpreted by many French officers as evidence of the failure of De Gaulle's policy and of the impossibility of keeping an independent Algeria from rebel domination.]

[Meanwhile, there are signs that some French officers now feel Algeria is lost to France and the West and are adopting attitudes of bitter resignation or indifference. If such sentiment spreads, it will probably lower the army's efficiency in]

25X1

25X1 (controlling settler and Moslem extremists after the referendum. [redacted] is said to have commented [redacted] that "serious trouble" lies ahead in Algeria and that there will probably be a major uprising just before or during the referendum.)

25X1

25X1 ([redacted] both Moslems and Europeans in Oran are planning a general strike today)

25X1



25X1

5 Jan 61

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Page 6

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005500040001-6

Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005500040001-6

THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council

The Department of State

The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Department of Commerce

The Secretary of Commerce

Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

National Security Agency

The Director

National Intelligence Center

The Director

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET